Et Cetera

I finished this project today and submitted it. I've learned quite a bit along the way, including some things that disagree with earlier things I put on this blog. I'll post the whole project eventually but for now I just wanted to do a quick summation of things I've learned:

1. Early protestant thought unanimously account for particularity in salvation by election to faith. There is a two stage process of salvation: firstly it is won by Christ for us and then applied through the work of the Holy Spirit to us. This second stage is the gift of faith.
   
2. Election is, in this system, an a posteriori consideration. It accounts for sola gratia but it does not come at the head of a causal chain of saving events, and not everything that Christ does need necessarily relate to it.
3. Because of (1) and (2), early reformed thought can claim that the work of Christ in the atonement constitutes a genuine and free offer of redemption for the reprobate as well as the elect. Therefore they can also say that God loves all without distinction.
4. In later protestant orthodoxy this formula is rejected. Election is moved to an a priori position at the head of the ordo salutis. There are good reasons for this, its not just the imposition of scholastic thought.
   
5. But because of this reformed orthodoxy can no longer say that "God so loved the world" without serious qualification pertaining to predestination.

I've argued in the end that we should account for particularity as in (1). However, against what I've said earlier on this blog:

1. Christ's atoning sacrifice does not actually pay for all of the sin of the reprobate except their sin of rejecting him. (I argued this in the series I did on Hebrews.)
   
2. Instead, we must say that the benefits of Christ's death (redemption, reconciliation, forgiveness) are fully earned on behalf of the whole world, but applied to no-one until they (i.e. the elect) are united to Christ through the Holy Spirit.
3. Union with Christ is therefore a key doctrine for the atonement. It takes something that was accomplished externally to us, and applies it to us.
4. This system comes very close, but is not exactly the same as, the hypothetical universalism of Amyraut. It is vastly different to much modern reformed theology, which is closer to Owen.
   

Apart from one more post, with a link to the whole project in a few weeks, I'm wrapping up this blog for now. Thanks to all for your contributions and the many emails I have received. I'll open it up again if I do further work in reformed dogmatics at some stage.

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John Owen, The Death of Death

John Owen's treatise on the atonement is a polemical work, particularly against the doctrine of universal redemption. The 17th Century Arminian document The Remonstrance had advocated a free and responsible human action in response to God's saving activity. That is, God enables salvation through the atonement—a universally available offer that removes the obstacle in the path of man's free choice—but faith is man's decision to accept or reject this. Election occurs on the basis of God's foresight of this choice. Owen's The Death of Death is a defence of the classical reformed doctrine of limited atonement, based as it is on divine irresistable grace. In defending these doctrines Owen seeks to maintain that it is God who saves, and not merely who enables us to save ourselves. And therefore, since God is sovereign, there is a congruence between what God intended to accomplish by the atonement, and what is actually accomplished. If the atonement actually accomplishes salvation for the elect, Owen argues, then that must be what it was intended to do—that is, an atonement that was intentionally limited to the elect. There is an "infallible connection between God's purpose and will" (IV.i.8).

In his introductory material (I.i-ii), Owen outlines his general method and the logic of his argument which relies on the intention of God in sending Christ. Scripture describes what is accomplished by the cross as full salvation, and so therefore a universal atonement would imply one of several things:

• God has failed in his saving purpose because although he desired all to be saved, all are not. But this is clearly contrary to the character and nature of the omnipotent God. Or...
• All will be saved. But this is clearly contrary to Scripture. Or...
• The cross was not intended to save absolutely.

This third view finds adherents among Owen's opponents, both Arminian and Amyraldian since both hold a universal atonement. Owen can therefore argue against both positions simultaneously, despite their obvious soteriological difference. This argument is developed over the following sections of Books I and II.

After grounding his soteriology within a reformed Trinitarian framework (I.iii), Owen's basic assertion is that the means of redemption described in Scripture are the "death, oblation and blood-shedding of Jesus Christ" (I.ii), and that these means perfectly accomplish the ends of redemption also described in Scripture as "the glory of God through saving of the elect." (II.i). These assertions are developed through sections I.iii-v and II.i-v respectively.

In describing the means (I.iii-v), Owen's focus is to unite the oblation and intercession of Christ under the umbrella of atonement. He must do this to argue against the Amyralidian position, and particularly against Thomas More, who asserted the double mediatorial role of Christ. For More, Christ is a universal mediator with respect to his oblation, but a special mediator for the elect with respect to his intercession and thus adheres to point (iii) above—the cross in and of itself was not intended to save absolutely. Owen argues against this primarily through the unity of the person of the mediator. Once again the argument revolves around the intention of Christ. "If Christ really intended and desired that the whole world, or all men in the world, should believe, he would also, no doubt, have prayed [inteceded] for more effectual means of grace to be granted to them" (I.viii). The intention of Christ is made clear in the nature of his intercession; that only the elect are saved (I.vii.3). And since there is only one mediator (I.vii.2)—only one person—this must also be the intention of the oblation as well.

In his discussion of the ends (II.i-v), Owen's focus is to show that the ultimate end of the work of Christ is the glory of God through the salvation of the elect. Against both the Arminian and Amyraldian positions, the work of Christ does not provide the avenue by which man may be saved, and then stop short of saving anyone. The atonement is not described in Scripture as occurring for the sake of the Father (II.i.2), nor the Son (II.i.1), but for our salvation. Nevertheless, the ultimate end is the glory of God.

Books III and IV contain detailed exegetical arguments, particularly relating to the passages of Scripture most used by Owen's opponents—those passages that speak of the will of God that all men should be saved (eg. 1 Tim 2:4, 2 Pet 3:9), or those that speak of Christ's atonement or mediation as for the world (eg. John 3:16, 1 John 2:2). With regards to the former category, Owen argues that all refers to all without distinction—all classes of men—rather than all without exception. With regards to the latter, Owen argues that world is unqualified and may be taken in many ways, including at times speaking of the elect (IV.i).

I shall finish with a brief critical reflection. The weakness in Owen's argument surrounds the union of the oblation and intercession of Christ and the consequent limitation of the atonement at the point of intention. It is difficult to see why Christ can not have intended one end by the oblation, and another—more particular—end by his intercession. Could not Christ have intended, by his death, to offer a genuine gospel of redemption to all mankind, to be apprehended by faith, and then as part of his ascendant sovereignty distribute that gift of faith to whomever he should please (Eph 4:8)? It is equally biblically defensible to speak of election to faith.

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Hypothetical Universalism in the Soteriology of the Synod of Dort

When the Synod of Dort convened in 1618/19 their agenda was set against the writing of the Arminians in The Remonstrance which outlined a soteriology of election based on foreknowledge of human choice, and with it a doctrine of universal atonement. The Remonstrance claimed that the atonement made salvation possible—and in that way it was universal—but that the human decision to accept Christ was the ultimate limiting factor in soteriology. Against this, the Synod of Dort affirmed a strong doctrine of predestination as God's sovereign and free choice:

Election is the immutable purpose of God, by which, before the foundations of the world were laid, he chose, out of the whole human race, fallen by their own fault from their primeval integrity into sin and destruction, according to the most free good pleasure of his own will, and of mere grace, a certain number of men, neither better nor worthier than others, but lying in the same misery with the rest, to salvation in Christ. (Dort, 1.7)

The chapter on predestination begins with an exposition of the sin of all men in Adam in a way typical of the infralapsarian formulation (Dort, 1.1). However, it moves immediately from there not to discuss the decree of God to save, neither the work of Christ, but the universal love of God. Drawing on 1 John 6:9 and John 3:16 it states: “But 'in this is the love of God manifested, that he sent his only begotten Son into the world, that every one who believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life.'”(Dort, 1.2) That is to say that the act of sending the Son in itself is an act of love by God towards the world, without limit as to particularity.

As is well known, the Synod of Dort does affirm a limited atonement. However it is less commonly reconsigned that, following Calvin and the reformed tradition, it understands atonement as the total work of Christ as mediator—from his pre-incarnate mediation through to his risen and exalted intercession at the right hand of the Father. Therefore, the act of election is seen by the Synod not at the point of the passion of Christ—the “atonement” in the sacrificial, narrower sense—but as an act of the exalted Christ through the sending of the Spirit. The decree of election is eternal but it must be executed temporally. That is to say that Christ must choose in time who shall be his, to impart the Spirit upon them, and to breath new life into them. This is an action not related to the cross, but related to his heavenly intercession for us. Election is election to faith:

That some, in time, have faith given them by God and other have it not given, proceeds from his eternal decree; For “known unto God are all his works, from the beginning of the world.” Acts xv. 18. Eph i.11. According to which decree, he graciously softens the hearts of the elect, however hard, and he bends them to believe: but the non-elect he leaves, in just judgment, to their own perversity and hardness. (Dort, 1.6)

The offer of the gospel is therefore a genuine offer to both the elect and the reprobate. Since “the death of the Son of God is a single and most perfect sacrifice and satisfaction for sins; of infinite value and price, abundantly sufficient to expiate the sins of the whole world”, then it follows that “the promise of the gospel... ought to be announced and proposed, promiscuously and indiscriminately, to all nations and men to whom God, in his good pleasure, hath sent the gospel, with the command to repent and believe.” Salvation consists therefore along two related but ultimately independent axis: the first being the free gift of the Son by the Father to expiate sin, and the second the election of the Father, Son and Spirit to faith of those who will believe and therefore be saved.

This formulation is not the same thing as the universal atonement of The Remonstrance. In the soteriology of Dort, Christ does not expiate the sin of the whole world. Dort affirms:

For this was the most free counsel, and gracious will and intention of God the Father, that the life-giving and saving efficacy, of the most precious death of his own Son, should exert itself in all the elect... (Dort, 2.8).

The death of Christ, following the Lombardian formulation, is sufficient for the whole world, but efficient for the elect alone. However, this is not the same as what is meant today by “limited atonement”. There is a sense in which the death of Christ is efficient for no-one at all in particular, and therefore only hypothetically efficient for the elect, until they are given faith. The quote above finishes this way:

...in order [that the Son should] give them justifying faith, and thereby lead them to eternal life (Dort, 2.8).

In the soteriology of the Synod of Dort, the passion of Christ—his sacrificial death—completely merits salvation for the elect, but effects it in no-one and is therefore efficient for no-one. It is the work of the electing Son in sending the Spirit to impart faith that makes the cross of Christ efficient for the elect alone. In this way the Canons of Dort can hold both to a genuine, universally applicable offer of the gospel proving the love of God for the world—which all reject because of Sin—and then a particular redemption on the basis of election to faith.

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Predestination and Assurance in English Protestantism, Part 6 - Christology and Election

As I wind up this series, I want to reflect on Muller's perspective on Perkins and post-reformation dogmatics. Unlike Ashley Null's lectures (and the direction that this series of posts has gone), Muller argues strongly in Christ and the Decree (and other places) for his readers to see continuity between the reformation thinkers, particularly Calvin, and the post-reformed orthodox thinkers such as Perkins. He doesn't necessarily deny that there is some discontinuity as well, just that it may have been exaggerated to serve neo-orthodox ends. The continuity, he argues, lies in what they have attempted to keep, clarify and systematise from reformed theology.

Continuity in Christology and Election

Firstly, they have certainly maintained the functional Christology of Calvin. Notice again in Perkins' diagram how Christ is designated the "mediator of the elect". In a way that closely resembles Calvin in Institutes II.xvi, Perkins is able to explain how every aspect of the life, death, resurrection and intercession of Christ is for us, to be apprehended by faith:

"This approach to Christology mirrors Calvin's stress on Christ as Deus manifestatus in carne and bears witness to the Reformed development of a Christology neither "from above" nor "from below" but in the historical line of the covenant-promise, as the nexus of the temporal causality of salvation and the eternal will of God to save." (Christ and the Decree, 142)

To speak of Christ is mediator between God and man implies necessarily - just as it had with the reformers - a two-fold nature (cf. Institutes II.xiv). As God he is the electing God, and man, the elect son. Since Christ uniquely stands at this point, he straddles both the eternal decree, and its temporal execution. Perkins then makes explicit in his formulation what we might argue, and certainly what he believes Calvin implies: that the incarnation then stands as the "foundation of the execution of the decree" (A Golden Chain, XV).

However this poses a Trinitarian problem for Perkins. How can Christ incarnate be subject to the decree if Christ has "together with the Father decreed all things" (A Golden Chain, XV)? His solution is that Christ (i.e. the eternal Son in his office of mediation) is subordinate to the execution of the decree:

"[Christ is] called of his Father from all eternitie to perfome the office of the mediatour, that in him all those which should bee saved might be chosen." (A Golden Chain, XV)

Muller claims that Perkins' solution is inevitable once Calvin's Christology is developed:

"For Calvin it had been sufficient to show that the saving will of God the Son was prior to the sending of his Son. In the increasingly sophisticated systems of developing orthodoxy, a stricter, clearer formulation was needed if the possible subordinationist implications of Calvin's fluid use of the name Christ and his conception of the election of the mediator were to be overcome. The presence of careful Trinitarian arguments at several points in Perkins' Christology represents the working-out of a primary implication and a resolution of a major tension in Calvin's systematic thought." (Christ and the Decree, 149)

And so reformed Christology, argues Muller, finds its logical outworking in the thought of Perkins.

Discontinuity in Predestination

It is this formulation of Christology that results in the a-priori loci of predestination within the doctrine of God rather than the doctrine of Soteriology where it had resided in Calvin. If Christ himself is not to be made subordinate to the decree then Christ must be conceived of primarily as the electing God. Therefore predestination is not properly thought of as the work of the Father, but as the work of the undivided trinity. In Perkins' Golden Chain the doctrine of decrees is found exactly in this locus; following not even the divine attributes, but his exposition of Trinity. The execution of the decree therefore follows the divine ordering of the persons:

"[The Father] is the beginning of actions, because he beginneth every action of himselfe, effecting it by the Sonne and the holie Ghost." (A Golden Chain, V)

As the work of the undifferentiated trinity, election guarantees the freedom of God:

"[Election is] that by which God in himselfe hath necessarily, and yet freely, from all eternity determined al things." (A Golden Chain, V)

The decree dogmatically functions within the soteriology of Perkins not to safeguard sola gratia as it had within the Reformers, but to prevent the imputation of necessity upon God. It is not the grace of God being guarded by Perkins in his formulation of predestination, but his sovereignty. It is this formulation that necessitates the a-priori positioning of the decree of election.

"Perkins clearly hopes to maintain the freedom of secondary causes while asserting the complete sovereignty of God in the work of salvation; and this sovereignty will appear a priori, beginning with the intra-trinitarian determination of the pattern of salvation and proceeding to the execution of the decree rather than as an a posteriori rationalization." (Christ and the Decree, 167)

Muller therefore is quite right: it was not scholasticism, neither an overly speculative soteriology that caused the shift in loci, it was the way Perkins systematised and organised the implications of Calvin's Christology using the best theological tools of his day.

"These various degrees of God's acts of predestination as elaborated by Perkins have provided us entrance into a speculative discussion of the decree quite unlike the formulations we encountered in the work of Calvin or even Beza, Ursinus, and Zanchius. Yet, as in the other aspects of Perkins' system that we have examined, the governing factor is not a purely metaphysical problem but the relationship of Christology and soteriology to the decrees." (Christ and the Decree, 169)

A Shift in Soteriology?

Perkins has, it is fair to say with Muller, maintained the Trinitarian ground and Christological focus of the doctrine of predestination found within the reformed thinkers. In Muller's analysis one can certainly see the clear lines of continuity that can be drawn between Calvin and Perkins. Nevertheless we have noted some clear distinctions in the way the theology developed. The question remains, what are the implications?

The first is that Perkin's conception of mediatorial Christology as subordinate to the execution of the decree necessitates a particular soteriology. Christ has not come for us men and for our salvation, as in Calvin (and Nicea!), but as he foundation of the temporal execution of the decree of election. This is a big difference. Whereas in Calvin, every aspect of Christ's life as anointed mediator was for salvation (Institutes, II.xvi), for Perkins every aspect of Christ's life as anointed mediator is for election.

Perkins must link atonement with intercession for this very reason:

"For the Sonne doth not sacrifice for those, for whom he doth not pray: because to make an intercession and sacrifice are conjoyned: but hee prayeth only for the elect and for beleevers." (A Treatise, 609)

"The atonement is limited in the sense that sacrifice is conjoined to sanctification. Perkins thus conjoins the eternal decree with a temporal work: "the price is appointed and limited to the elect alone by the Fathers decree and the Sonnes intercession and oblation." (A Treatise, 609) Christ not only merits salvation but also effectively works salvation in those to whom it has been promised and for whom it has been performed." (Christ and the Decree, 168)

However, it was Perkins' Christology that has driven this formulation of limited atonement. There is no similar conception found in Calvin. Even if one was to argue (as many do) that Calvin does utilize a limited atonement, it is not on these grounds.

The original problem was Trinitarian - the realisation that Christ is the electing God seemed to subject Christ to the decree. However, in my view, it was not necessary that the incarnation be made the foundation of the temporal execution of the decree to solve this problem. Instead, we can understand election, as I believe Calvin did, as one of the works of the now incarnate and interceding Christ.

I'm going to move on to a (briefer) series of posts on Calvin now. So it is good that we have these questions already framed to ask of him.

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Predestination and Assurance in English Protestantism, Part 5 - 2 Peter 1

The question I want to think through in this post is what place good works (or sanctification) has in assurance?

So far in this series we noted that Perkins' view of predestination has caused several pastoral issues, one of which is in assurance. In the early reformers assurance of salvation rests in the objective work of Christ. In later reformed orthodoxy (Perkins has been our example) assurance rests in self-examination. The Practical Syllogism of the Westminster Confession is another example of this later type of assurance:

1. Whoever believes/does good work is elect.
2. I believe/do good works.
3. Therefore I am elect.

The exegetical question that always comes up in this context is 2 Peter 1:5-11, and indeed this is the text that the Westminster Confession is drawing on in Chapter XVIII on assurance. Is Peter encouraging us to "make our calling and election sure" by introspection as to these virtues?

Certainly the theme of 2 Peter is to encourage perseverance amongst those who profess faith (cf. 2 Pet 3:17-18). It is not enough, argues Peter throughout Chapter 1, to rest on the laurels of our conversion. We may have "escaped the corruption of the world" (2 Pet 1:4), but the Christian life is an ongoing one, not a static one (2 Pet 1:8). It is evident that Peter (and rest of the NT in general) does not have the static view of "regeneration" that has been pervasive since the enlightenment. There is certainly not a "once saved, always saved" attitude here - the Christian life is one of growth, "multiplying grace and peace" (2 Pet 1:2), not one of stagnation (2 Pet 1:9).

If there was a point in our life (eg. our conversion) to which we could look for assurance of salvation then assurance would be introspective, in a heinous way. "Once saved, always saved," we would quip, and then go about our lives as if nothing had happened, fully assured of a salvation that probably wasn't coming. It is exactly this attitude that Peter is trying to combat. The Christian life is precisely that - a life. It must be lived out until the end. In other words, its not just perseverance of the saints; its that the saints are the ones who persevere.

All of this is not to say that Peter does not conceive of salvation as a gracious work of God from start to finish. Peter's theology of grace is as deeply rooted in election as Paul's is (2 Pet 1:3, 10). The eternal purpose of God in election is accurately worked in the economy: not an immediate bolt of lightening in each life--a moment of conversion--but sovereignly over the course of lives lived in faith, virtue, knowledge (2 Pet 1:5), self control, steadfastness, godliness (1:6), brotherly affection and love (1:7). If you want to know who is saved, Peter is arguing, then you have to look at the end of their lives, rather than their "conversion" moment. Salvation is not a momentary hapax. Stay the course!

For in this way there will be richly provided for you an entrance in to the eternal kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. (2 Pet 1:11)

In other words, Peter isn't encouraging his readers to introspect: "do I have enough faith?", "have I enough self-control?" etc, and then to try harder if they realise that they do not. Rather, he is encouraging them once they already trust in God's promises (2 Pet 1:4-5) to persevere in these virtues, building on them so that they will "never fall" and therefore "make their calling and election sure" (2 Pet 1:10). Peter knows that these virtues do not come from our own effort anyway, but by the power of God (2 Pet 1:3). Introspection would be pointless; rather we should look with faith to God as the source of these "very great promises" (2 Pet 1:4) to "grant [them] to us" (2 Pet 1:3) and once we have faith add to it.

So for Peter, can we be sure of salvation? Absolutely.

How? Not by looking to ourselves to "make every effort" (2 Pet 1:5), but by looking with faith to the "very great promises" of God that enable us to "make every effort" in the first place.

It's interesting to see the way that Calvin reflects on this passage in his commentary on 2 Peter:

Now a question arises, Whether the stability of our calling and election depends on good works, for if it be so, it follows that it depends on us. But the whole Scripture teaches us, first, that God's election is founded on his eternal purpose; and secondly, that calling begins and is completed through his gratuitous goodness. The Sophists, in order to transfer what is peculiar to God's grace to ourselves, usually pervert this evidence. But their evasions may be easily refuted. For if any one thinks that calling is rendered sure by men, there is nothing absurd in that; we may however, go still farther, that every one confirms his calling by leading a holy and pious life. But it is very foolish to infer from this what the Sophists contend for; for this is a proof not taken from the cause, but on the contrary from the sign or the effect. Moreover, this does not prevent election from being gratuitous, nor does it shew that it is in our own hand or power to confirm election. For the matter stands thus, — God effectually calls whom he has preordained to life in his secret counsel before the foundation of the world; and he also carries on the perpetual course of calling through grace alone. But as he has chosen us, and calls us for this end, that we may be pure and spotless in his presence; purity of life is not improperly called the evidence and proof of election, by which the faithful may not only testify to others that they are the children of God, but also confirm themselves in this confidence, in such a manner, however, that they fix their solid foundation on something else. (Calvin, Commentary on 2 Peter, 1:10).

Calvin's point is simple. You can not confirm your election by introspection: you will never know if you have done enough good works. For Calvin, you can not confirm your election no matter how hard you look because it is ordained in the secret council of God. You must look at Christ.

However you can use introspection as evidence of your election provided you fix your solid foundation of assurance on something else. The reason for this is what Peter argues: you shall not be able to do these good works in the first place if your eyes are fixed on yourself - they must be fixed firmly on the "promises of God" (2 Pet 1:4).

Good works then take a kind of secondary role. If you look at yourself and realise that you don't do any at all, then probably that's good reason to doubt your salvation. However, if you fix your eyes on Christ then good works and perseverance will flow naturally from that; there is no need to doubt because, as Peter elsewhere pointed out, "Everyone who calls on the name of the Lord will be saved." (Acts 2:21)

The problem that we were noting in this series of posts is that the preaching of supralapsarian double-predestination and the doctrinal focus on election as the formal cause of soteriology removes the ability to put hope and assurance in the objective work of Christ since you must know first whether you are elect.

So my conclusion is this. In light of reflection on 2 Peter, the Practical Syllogism of the Westminster Confession has a point - to an extent. But set within the soteriological framework of double predestination, it does more harm than good. Christian faith is not introspective - it looks to Christ. Peter knew this very well. The moment faith takes its eyes from Christ, it begins to sink and must again cry out with Peter himself, O Lord! Save me! (Matt 14:30)

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Predestination and Assurance in English Protestantism, Part 4 - Theological Consequences

I'm still reflecting on Ashley Null's fascinating series of lectures, though this post will move past what he presented and towards my own thoughts and synthesis.

What are the theological consequences of an a-priori positioning of election within a causal structural soteriology? We saw last time that supralapsarian double-predestination forced Perkins (and English protestantism) through a theological paradox into a bi-covenantal schema whereby the purpose of the covenant of grace was to enable regenerate man to fulfill the covenant of works.

This formulation creates a pastoral uncertainty - how do I know that I'm saved? I am saved if I am elect, but how do I know that? With Perkin's formulation, I can't even know that God loves me. Notice in his diagram where he places the love of God: it is half way down the diagram on the "elect" side. That is, I can only know that God loves me if I already know that I am elect. God's decision to love is entirely contingent on his decree and he doesn't love the reprobate.

This is a far cry from Calvin's soteriological formulation (by contrast) which is entirely based on the love of God. God, says Calvin, is acting for us in sending Christ - not for the elect only, but for the world (Institutes II.xvi.2-3). Even though Calvin believes we stand under the wrath of God, God is simultaneously at enmity with us and yet still loves us:

For how could [God] have given in his only-begotten Son a singular pledge of his love to us if he had not already embraced us with his free favour? ... However much we may be sinners by our own fault, we nevertheless remain his creatures. However much we have brought death upon ourselves, yet he has created us unto life. Thus he is moved by pure and freely given love of us to receive us into grace. (Institutes, II.xvi.2-3)

Therefore, everything that Christ is and does shows this love of God for us. If Calvin were drawing Perkin's chart, it would all begin from love and it is Calvin's infralapsarian formulation that permits this. So Calvin can be confident that God will accept him despite his sin because he has already shown his love for him in Christ.

For Perkins, we can have no such basis for this confidence. Therefore, in Perkins' system, how can I know that God is for me?

1. Salvation is sola gratia so any inkling or stirring of my soul must be evidence of the work of the Holy Spirit in my life. In this case God is for me.
   
2. Conversion constitutes the renewal of affections, to allow me to fulfill the covenant of works. The work of the Holy Spirit, therefore, is my co-operation with God to fulfill this covenant. In this case God is for me.
3. But since the reprobate also show a temporary kind of conversion and good works, the true evidence that God is for me comes when I see grace continually increasing in my life - that is, I do more and more good works.

It's not just that Perkins bases assurance of salvation on works - which is certainly true and causes a degree of introspection - its that faith itself no longer has the same basis as in Calvin. In Institutes III.ii Calvin defines faith as the complete persuasion and comprehension that God is good to me.

And without faith it is impossible to please him, for whoever would draw near to God must believe that he exists and that he rewards those who seek him. (Heb 11:6)

For Perkins, I can only know if God is good to me when I consider my own works; whether I am doing enough good things. Grace must be continually increasing so that I can see evidence of my ongoing regeneration by the Spirit. My faith is my co-operation with whatever grace God gives me - an act of the will. This theology isn't unique to Perkins, notice carefully the language of the Westminster Confession of Faith on assurance:

This certainty is not a bare conjectural and probable persuasion grounded upon a fallible hope; but an infallible assurance of faith founded upon the divine truth of the promises of salvation, the inward evidence of those graces unto which these promises are made, the testimony of the Spirit of adoption witnessing with our spirits that we are the children of God, which Spirit is the earnest of our inheritance, whereby we are sealed to the day of redemption. (Westminster Confession of Faith, XVIII.ii)

Assurance is based on the inward evidence of grace. Confusing language. Perhaps the next paragraph clarifies:

This infallible assurance does not so belong to the essence of faith, but that a true believer may wait long, and conflict with many difficulties, before he be partaker of it: yet, being enabled by the Spirit to know the things which are freely given him of God, he may, without extraordinary revelation in the right use of ordinary means, attain thereunto. And therefore it is the duty of every one to give all diligence to make his calling and election sure, that thereby his heart may be enlarged in peace and joy in the Holy Ghost, in love and thankfulness to God, and in strength and cheerfulness in the duties of obedience, the proper fruits of this assurance; so far is it from inclining men to looseness. (Westminster Confession of Faith, XVIII.iii)

In other words, assurance doesn't belong with faith but it is nevertheless our duty to make our calling and election sure by looking to the fruits of this assurance - our sanctification. That is to say that the inward evidence of the graces to which the promises are made (from Paragraph ii) is the fruit of the Spirit.

Whereas for Calvin faith is assurance, since salvation is based in the objective work of Christ, for Perkins - in my view - assurance is something more subjective, based on the internal work of the Spirit. Since Perkins would seem to have 2 Peter 1 on his side, we should do some work on that text before we can properly theologically evaluate these two positions.

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Predestination and Assurance in English Protestantism, Part 3 - Perkins

Continuing a series of reflections on Dr. Ashley Null's lectures at Moore College this month. I'm looking in this post at Perkins. Even a cursory reading shows that there is significant revisions between early protestant Christianity and his system. Dr. Null notes two:

1. For Cranmer, election does lead to salvation, but Cranmer restrains from grounding soteriology in the will of God. Perkin's major work on the subjection The Golden Chain outlines his soteriology as a series of formal causes beginning with election and reprobation.
2. For Cranmer, threat of punishment does lead people to God, but there is a stress on loving gratitude as the major motivating factor. Perkin's Homily on Repentance lists five reasons to repent (duty to God, hope for forgiveness, shame of sin, fear of punishment, suddenness of death), none of which involve gratitude.

The question that must be asked, before evaluation of Perkin's soteriology, is what socio-historical forces account for this change in emphasis? After understanding Perkins in his own context, we can evaluate whether the change in emphasis is substantial.

The Doctrine of Repentance

By 1600 the Elizabethan settlement and following decades had dimmed puritan hope for further reform of the English church. Given the obvious fact that the church would stay roughly as it was, Perkins (and others) concentrated on what they saw their primary task to be - not reform but the cure of souls. This pastoral concern must be viewed in light of what had happened since the time of Edward VI.

Although England was officially protestant from 1547-1553, reform was slow. Several historians have argued that England was protestant in name only, even for several decades into the reign of Elizabeth (into the 1570s and 80s). Given this degree of agnosticism about religious alignment amongst the English people, many English theologians came to see the trauma of the Marian persecutions as God's judgement on England for this moral and spiritual failure. In this environment then, repentance is emphasised not out of gratitude to God (Cranmer), but in order to avoid another experience of God's wrath. This theology is Deuteronomistic in which the basis of practical religion is obligation: moralism - a tendency that already existed in English theology anyway but was certainly exacerbated by Mary.

The Doctrine of Election

Given the high degree of English agnosticism, the protestant church found it also necessary to safeguard its theological foundation. The Roman Catholics felt that the wavering population which had not objected too strenuously to Mary might be drawn back. Their polemic was essentially that the protestants used the same soteriological system, except that they treated faith as the human work in response to God's grace. As it always had been since the time of Augustine at least, sola gratia was safeguarded by election. The concept of effectual grace is not found in Cranmer explicitly, but certainly is in the Elizabethan homilies.

In the context of anti-catholic polemic the doctrine took a different shape to that which it had since the reformation. Election for the reformers bred assurance because it was considered a-postiori (ie. election guarantees a believer's salvation because it is the work of God from start to finish). On the other hand, the English puritans considered it a-priori since by doing so they could assure their Catholic counterparts that faith was not a human response to God's grace. Salvation was sola gratia.

In 1591 Perkins published The Golden Chain in which he described (with visual aids) his soteriology as a series of formal causes beginning from the secret counsel of God. Election and reprobation were the co-ordinate decrees by which God foreordained everything to his glory: some to be saved, and others to be lost.

There are many consequences of this supralapsarian double-predestinarian formulation of soteriology. Muller also has some very interesting reflections on Perkins. Both of which we will return to in the next post in this series.

The Paradox

For now, note the paradox within English protestant theology. Salvation is entirely an act of God, based completely on the eternal decrees. However repentance is a human work, a moralistic call to do what is right. How is this resolved?

Perkins and others find the resolution in Covenant/Federal Theology in which they find the locus of salvation within the covenant of grace, and the locus of repentance within the covenant of works. Whereas in Adam no-one fulfills the covenant of works, the purpose of the covenant of grace is so that in Christ the regenerate man might fulfill this original covenant of works. The desire to believe is therefore the seed of the Father, a gracious act. The desire however produces our human action to fulfill the covenant of works - our faithful response to the Father's grace. In terms of Dr. Null's thesis, personhood has become an achievement once more.

The regenerate, Perkins urges in his homily on repentance, must therefore daily undertake acts of repentance based on close introspection:

1. A close examination of conscience with due consideration to the holy law and misery of sin.
2. A confession of sin as if it were the day of judgement.
3. Prayer for grace and strength based on the promises of the gospel.

Point #3 then focuses the will of the believer to co-operate with the work of the Holy Spirit. It seems to me that the Catholics had a point after all.

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